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1966]

RECENT CASES

Liberalization of the grounds for divorce should be accompanied
by a stricter policy towards recognition of divorces obtained in one
jurisdiction by residents of another. Now that the cause which has
sent New York couples to foreign courts for "quickie" divorces has
been alleviated, there is less need to recognize such divorces. Further,
the legislature of New York has clearly established the state's public
policy concerning recognition of foreign divorces, and New York
residents must abide by this decision.
William T. Cain

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO PuI3LIC TRIAL-TOTAL EXCLUSION
EXCEPT TE BAR AND PEss.-Defendant was convicted of indecent as-

sault of a female. After the jury had been sworn and the prosecution
had finished its opening statement, the state asked the court to exclude
from the courtroom all spectators except members of the bar and press
and all witnesses not on the stand. This motion was granted over the
defendant's objection. Held: Reversed and remanded. Excluding all
spectators except the bar and press because salacious testimony is
expected violates the defendant's constitutional right' to a public
trial. State v.Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966).
An evaluation of the Schmit case requires consideration of the
following questions.
1. What constitutes a public trial?
2. What leeway does the criminal trial court have in excluding the

public or a portion thereof?
3. Must the accused show specific prejudice caused by the exclusion?

The courts do not agree as to what constitutes a public trial. Some
jurisdictions hold it simply to be "not secret,"2 while others, like Minnesota, hold that a criminal trial must be free for the public to attend
if it desires and that the doors of the courtroom should not be
3
closed.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

in which neither party was domiciled in the state is void and subject to collateral
attack, and another state need not give full faith and credit to the decree. For
discussion of the Kentucky domestic relations law, see Whiteside, Ten Years of
Kentucky Domestic Relations Law, 1955-1965, 54 Ky. L.J. 206 (1966).
1 MIN. CONST. art. 1,
enjoy2 the right to a speedy
Keddington v. State,
Geise v. United States, 262

§ 6. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
and public trial."
19 Ariz. 457, 459, 172 Pac. 273, 274 (1918). Cf.,
F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958); Callahan v. United States,

240 Fed. 683 (9th Cir. 1917); State v. Croak, 167 La. 92, 94, 118 So. 703, 704
(1928).
3
People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 245, 37 Pac. 153, 154 (1894); State v.
Schrnit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Minn. 1966).
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The courts which allow liberal exclusions base their action mainly
upon the following arguments:
[T]he undesirable effect on public morals of an open trial of a salacious
case; the unnecessary embarrassment to witnesses caused by the presence
of an audience; and the influence [that] the presence of the public has
on both attorneys and the jury, encouraging
histrionics in the one and
4
undermining the impartiality of the other.

In Schmit, the court concluded that such exclusions -are not
justified because the plain and clear meaning of the phrase "public
trial" is diluted if all persons who have no direct interest in the trial
are excluded. 5 There is a vast difference between a trial from which
everyone but a special class of persons is excluded, and one which
everyone except a designated few is free to attend.6
Schmit rejects the view that the public morals will be adversely
affected, "particularly in the light of the details and probable innuendos
included in extensive and prominent coverage by news media."7 The
court supports its position with the following quotation from United
States v. Kobli8 as follows:
[W] hatever may have been the view in an earlier and more formally modest age, we think that the franker and more realistic attitude
of the present day towards matters of sex precludes a determination
that all members of the public, the mature and experienced as well as
the immature and impressionable, may reasonably be excluded from
the trial of a sexual offense upon the ground of public morals.9
It has been suggested that more salacious offences would be
brought to trial if the public were excluded. Undoubtedly, many persons, particularly females, would rather suffer the injustice of an indecent crime and allow the offender to go free than face the embarrassment of a public trial. However, the disadvantages of exclusion
far outweight its advantages. First, the news media would have to be
excluded, and this is a violation of the freedom of the press. 10
Secondly, if the accuser were allowed to bring the charges in private,
the witnesses would not have the sobering effect of knowing that the
public is weighing their testimony. Lastly, even though everyone is
not able to appreciate the position of the accuser in such cases, our
4 Note, 49 CoLum . L. REv. 110, 116 (1949).

5 139 N.W.2d 800, 805.

6 People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 66, 123 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1954).

7 139 N.W.2d 800, 805.

8 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
9 172 F.2d 919, 923.
10 Although this writer is opposed to the total exclusion of the news media,
he feels that a news medium should not be allowed to remain in the courtroom
when its presence obstructs the due administration of justice. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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system of law is based upon the protection of the accused until he is
proven guilty. Any defendant has certain rights; one of the most
important is the right to public trial.
Several state statutes empowering the trial judge to exclude the
public in salacious cases have been held unconstitutional." There are
however certain generally conceded exclusions which the Schmit court
is correct in recognizing.' 2 However, the Schmit court does not feel
that the "mere embarrassment of adult witnesses with no showing of
inability to testify" 13 warrants the dilution of the right to public trial.
"It is difficult to conceive of a situation where, in the interest of public
morals, it is justifiable to exclude, without any exceptions, the entire
1 4
public, even temporarili."'
The court in Schmit feels that the "public" includes more than the
bar, news media, and friends and relatives of the accused. There is
no assurance that the news media will give an impartial, 5 complete,
or accurate account of a trial. Permitting friends and relatives of the
accused, as allowed in most cases of general exclusion, to remain in
the courtroom may not effectively fulfill the requirement. The accused
may not have any friends or relatives that can or are willing to attend
the trial. "Only the presence of the public generally can insure the
defendant the public trial to which he is rightfully entitled." 6
In the Schmit case, a public trial is viewed as a right and benefit
of the "public."' 7 The court points out that a person drawn to the
trial by curiosity might be an undiscovered witness' 8 and that attendance at a trial is also a form of legal education for the interested
spectator. 19 However, the most important reasons for public trials are
that they serve as a check on the arbitrary, unjust actions by the
11 People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491 (1897); State v. Beckman,
12 United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (to

96 Utah 528, 88 P.2d 461 (1939).

avoid violence in the courtroom); People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190

P.2d 290 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (infant spectators); State v. Hashimoto, 47 Haw.

185, 389 P.2d 146 (1963) (to preserve the decorum of the courtroom); Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949) (inability of
witnesses to testify); E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 757, 125
N.E.2d 896 (1955) (to prevent overcrowding of the courtroom).
13 139 N.W.2d 800, 806.
14 State ex reL Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 149, 21 N.W.2d 328, 331
(1946).
15 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
10 State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500, 510 (1950).
17 139 N.W.2d 800, 807.
18 139 N.W.2d at 800; see also United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919,
921 (3d Cir. 1949); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944);
People v. jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 63, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954).

19 139 N.W.2d 800, 807; see also United States v. Kobli, supra note 18;

State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 255, 118 A.2d 707, 709 (Super. Ct. 1955).
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court 20 and remind the
witnesses of the responsibility and seriousness
21
of giving testimoiiy.

The court points out that, if the trial court erroneously excludes
the public, the trial will be reversed without any showing of prejudice.
22
Prejudice is presumed because the right has been violated.

The right to public trial, as guaranteed by the Kentucky consti-

tution,23 has not been reviewed recently by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals. 24 The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that infants under

the age of sixteen may be excluded in salacious cases -5 and that
witnesses not on the stand may be excluded by a motion from either

26
the defendant or the Commonwealth.

When a case concerning the right to public trial comes before the
Court of Appeals, this writer recommends that the liberal viev of

Schmit be adopted in salacious cases and a fortiori in cases of a less
sensitive nature. The function of the criminal trial court is to try the
case at hand, not to protect the public morals by exclusions. Any exclusion that is necessary to prevent interference with, or obstruction

of, the due administration of justice and the orderly conduct of the
courts should be allowed.2 7 However, the right to public trial is too
basic and fundamental to the accusatorial system of justice to be
diluted by puritanical courts in the name of public morality and mere
embarrassment of adult witnesses and spectators.
Michael P. Cox

TORTS-CONTuIBUrOR Y NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAw.-Appellant

Goetz purchased a house which he had visited only three times, twice
at night and once when he did not leave his car. On the northern end
20 State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, see also United States v. Kobli, 172
F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); eople v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 244, 37 Pac.
153, 154 (1894); State v. Haskins, supra note 19.
21 State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966); see also State v.
Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 255, 118 A.2d 707, 709 (Super. Ct. 1955).
22 State v. Schmit, supra note 21; see also United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d
919 (3d Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herald, 246 F. Supp. 363
(N.D.N.Y. 1965); People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P.2d 290 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1948); State v. Haskins, supra note 21.
23 "In prosecution by indictment or information, [the accused] ...
shall have
a speedy public trial." Ky. CONST. § 11. The 1966 proposed constitution makes
no change
in § 11.
24
Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944) (exclusion
because of inabilit yof witness to testify); Tate v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 685,
80 S.W.2d 817 (1935) (exclusion to prevent overcrowding in the courtroom);
Weadling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911) (exclusion to
prevent overcrdwding in the courtroom).
25 Ky. R. Cium. P. 9.50.
2
6 Ky. R. Catni. P. 9.48.
2
7 Deboor v. State, 243 Ind. 156, 182 N.E.2d 250 (1962).

